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I. Scientific Emergentism and Theological Methodology 
In a recent piece in the Asbury Theologicalfotlrnal, Nathan Crawforu has 
attempted to put current understandings of emergent phenomena within 
the neurosciences in conversation with Christian so teriology; in parti cula r, 
Crawford has sought to link up themes found in emergence with distinctively 
Wesleyan perspectives on sanctification. He defines emergence as "the theory 
that cosmic evolution repeatedly includes unpredictable, irreducible, and 
novel appearances."1 According to Crawford, theology can use the " kind 
of thinking" employed in the neurosciences to enrich its articulation of 
doctrinal matters, in this case the doctrine of enrjre sanctification.' Crawforu 
goes on to offer a constructive proposal that he believes sheds light on the 
debate between Kenneth]. Collins and Randy Maddox, proponents o f the 
two main competing interpretations of John Wesley's theology. Toward the 
end of his piece, Crawford argues that if the creation and evolution of 
human persons have been shown to be emergent phenomena, we can 
speculate that salvation and sanctification are emergent phenomena as well.; 
There is much to commend a methodo logy that seeks to illustrate 
coherence between the work of God in creation and the work of Gou in 
salva ti on. Th e achievements of science in term s of improving our 
understanding of the material world can illuminate and inform the task of 
soteriology, which is the branch of Christian theology that seeks to give a 
logica l account of the nature o f human salvation. Likewise, our 
unders tanding of how God works in salvation can shed light on God's 
creating and sustaining work in the natural world. All truth is God's truth, 
so we should expect general revelation and special revelation to be not only 
logically consistent, but also mutually reflective of one another. T he Christian 
worldview has the wherewithal to provide such a unified and integrated 
vision of reality. So, for instance, science can tell us much about the makeup 
of the human person in terms of the brain and neuroscience, which we can 
th en correlate with Chri stian theological anthropology.4 
Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind the limitations and potential 
pi tfall s o f such a methodology, some of which Crawford himself is exp li citly 
aware" To begin, we cannot assume that God's work in crea tion wi ll always 
have a direct or complete parallel with the Lord's work in salvation. While 
some such parallels may exist between the two spheres, we need to possess 
more than m erely sugges tive evidence b ased on loosely analogous 
relationships before we can make responsible ex trapolations. Moreover, rhe 
Christian Scriptures, interpreted in the conrext of the church, contain the 
cleares t and most complete revelation of Gou's saving activity in the world, 
and hence they should serve as our preeminent source for soteriological 
truth. This should have a sigruficant impact on our theological methodology. 
BL\NCHEITE: .A BRIEF LOOK AT IVfETIIODOLOGY AKD G RACE I I ()7 
Because our independent knowledge of soteriological truth through general 
revelation is often spotty, limited, and unclear, we should start with God's 
complete revelation in Scripture and work from there. Unless we have strong 
evidence from nature for a proposition to Joteriofogy-evidence that is 
stronger than the evidence we possess for a logically incompatible 
interpretation of Scripture-it is more epistemically and theologically sound 
to follow the light of God's special revelation regarding that proposition6 
Our methodology should differ substantially if we are dealing with 
scientific propositions-propositions about the natural world. In what I see 
as the classical Wesleyan view on the role of Scripture, the Bible does not 
purport to speak authorit.'ltively on the intricacies of the processes of nature. 
Questions about such topics are best posed and answered within the realm 
of the physical sciences'" This is not to say that the Bible has nothing to say 
about the nature of physical entities, but its primary purpose is to speak on 
matters of salvation and our relationship to God. l'\evertheless, it would 
also be a mistake to view science and theology as occupying utterly 
disconnected epistemic spheres, "never the two shaLl meet." As Alvin 
Plantinga has pointed out, belief that a divine creator is the ultimate cause 
of nature will (rightly) affect our evaluation of the plausibility of various 
scientific hypotheses, even if that creator never interferes directly in the 
world beyond the initial creation,' 
In addition to these methodological considerations, to which Crawford 
may well be amenable, many would take issue with his seeming view that all 
of God's work in creation from the Big Bang onward can be subsumed 
under a gradualistic, process-oriented paradigm via evolution.' He 
importantly leaves out the Big Bang itself-God's creation of the world out 
of nothing (creatio ex nihilo)-which surely must be seen as a non-gradual, 
ins tantaneous act; indeed it is a miracle. '° At the moment of the Big Bang, 
the natural universe in its nascent form comes into being out of nothing 
with all of the necessary prerequisites for life as the result of the sheer free 
will of God. Wesley pointed to creation and the giving of life as a species 
of the free grace of God, tl1e sovereign work of God alone." 
But beyond this, insisting that all of God's creative activity after the Big 
Bang falls under emergent or evolutionary labels seems to overshoot the 
scientific evidence. Are we certain that evolution or emergent phenomena 
can explain all complexity in nature, including the origin of life from non-
life? It seems to me that this would be to go beyond currently available 
scientific evidence, even if all biological complexity can be explained via 
natural, Darwinian evolution (Darwinism can begin only when there is life) . 
It is possible that God has performed miracles in the course of natural 
history that disrupt any emergent relationship between new phenomena 
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and old phenomena. Because we lack a comprehensive understanding of 
natural history, we should not assume that a comprehensive evolutionary 
or emergent paradigm can explain everything in the natural worlu . '2 
II. Competing Interpretations of Wesley Clarified 
In hi s p iece, Crawford brie fl y summarizes bo th Colli ns's and Maddox's 
interpre tations of Wesley's theology before presenting his own constructive 
proposa l. Crawford concedes that his cliscussion is "slightly arbitrary" and 
that " the two are much mon: nuanced" than he has shown.'.; One certainly 
cannot expect Crawford to address each and every subtlety in these two 
competing realLngs of Wesley, but in this case Crawford's lack of nuance 
results in a misrepresentation of Collins's view. While Crawford uoes note 
that the "instantaneous" (Collins's) anu the " process" (Maudox's) views, as 
he terms them, do not mutually excl ude one another, he fa il s to illustra te 
auequately the collJimclive nature of Collins's view of Wesley's understanuing 
of sanctification that incorporates both process and crisis 
The source of the confusion, I think, lies in Crawford 's frelju ent 
conflation of the process of sanctification with entire sanctification, a 
distinction that is critical in unders tanding Collins's view on these matters. 
In his pubLshed work, Collins has argued for a process of sanctification 
that begins after the crisis of the new birth anu in which the tempers o f the 
heart are gradually transformed and made holy by God's grace.' s The process 
of sanctification is to be clistinguished from entire sanctification, which in 
ColLns's reading o f Wesley is a second, distinct work of grace that issues in 
a ljuali tative change from an impure heart to a fu lly pure heart. In one 
moment the heart is impure, and in the next it is pure by the actualization 
of entirely sanctifying grace. 1(, Once the cli stinction between the process of 
sanctification and entire sanctiflcation is maue clear, one can see that Collins 
has a place in his interpretation for gradual growth by degree in sanctifl' ing 
grace. But whereas Maddox tend s to focus on the process-o riented 
climensions of \Ves ley's thought in a seemingly exclusive way, Collins presents 
an o,.do Ja/uliJ that incorporates both process anu cris is elements o f \Ves ln's 
soteriology. 
It is worth noting two more aspects of Crawford 's presenta tion that 
need some tweaking. Firstly, he reports that Collin s separates th e twofold 
problem of sin into the "ourwaru appearance" of sin and "the problem of 
original, inbred sin." In point of fact, Collins, following Wesley, distinguish es 
between tlcllla/sin, pertaining to deliberate acts that go against God's cl ea rl y 
revealed will ("will ful transgression of a known law of God"), anu 
or iI/bred sin, pertaining to sin as a state in the form of unholy tempers and 
dispositions. 17 The distinction between outward and inward sin is a different 
matter. To illustrate the diffe rence, one can commit actua l sin , on this 
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definition, even if it has no outward manifestation whatsoever. For instance, 
one may surrender to the intention to commit adultery without ever having 
the opportuni ry to commit the act outwardly. Inbred sin, alternatively, can 
manifes t itself in outward behavior, as when our partly well-intentioned 
actions are mixed with sinful motives. '" 
Secondly, Crawford seems to impute the view that original sin is a 
" juridical punishment upon all of humanity for the sin of Adam" to Collins, 
though thi s view is repudiated by both Collins and Maddox." Bo th 
in terpreters highlight Wesley's growing opposition to tll e notion of original! 
inherited guilt, which is reflected in Wesley's work in two ways: first, Wesley 
eventually argued that any guilt inherited from Adam is cancelled at birth 
by the atoning work of Christ. 20 Second, Wesley omitted the allusion to 
inherited guilt in the Ninth Article of the Anglican Thirty-nine Articles when 
he pruncu and reformulateu them for the Methodists in Am erica. Both 
interpreters agree that the eviuence from Wesley's works indicates that he 
was far more comfortable speaking about original sin in terms of inherited 
corruption rather than inherited gui/I. 21 
III. A Fresh Look at Wesleyan Grace 
Many of the church's ho ttest theological controversies have been over 
the role of divine grace in human salvation. It comes as no surprise then 
that some of the most central debates in Wesley stuuies are over the nature 
of divine grace and its relationship to the human will. On the one hand, 
Collins has argued for an overarching distinction between "co-operant grace" 
and " free grace." \'Vhen he speaks of co-operant grace, Collins is lifting up 
threads of Wesley's thought that involve divine-human cooperation, what 
is commonly called synergism. With co-operant grace, God takes the 
initiative, bur human beings must work as well. By free grace, Collins is 
referring to those points in Wesley's ordo .ra/utir (order of salvation) in which 
God works "alone" apart from all human working, what is commonly termed 
monergism 22 He sees free grace as a departure from clivine-human synergism 
in Wesley's thought. Collins seeks to hold these two conceptions of Wesleyan 
grace in a conjunctive balance. On his interpretation of Wesley's though t, 
God "works alone" in the ordo .ra/uti.r (via free grace) in prevenient grace, 
justification / regeneration, and entire sanctification. 23 
On the other hand, Maddox identifies "responsible grace" as the 
overarching conception of grace in Wesley's theology. Maddox's responsible 
grace is essentially identical to Collins's co-operant grace. It highlights the 
necessiry of God's gracious, empowering initiative, wlule afftrming that 
human persons must also work with this grace in a divine-human synergism.24 
Collins wants to affirm Maddox's insights, but he argues that a failure to 
incorporate free grace into one's overall view o f grace results in a distorted, 
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semi-Pelagian read ing of Wesley's theology that neglects Wesley's well-
worked theme of the work of God alolle2 ' But although Maddox does no t 
give the monergistic work of God a name or make it a central feature in his 
historical and constructive account of \'\fesley's theology, he nevertheless 
tlnds monergism in Wesley's theo logy in terms of God's creating and 
sus taining activity in the worJd.2G Collins, too, find s the theme of monergism 
in Wesley's understanding of creation2? 
Before we evaluate these two reigning conceptions of Wesleyan grace, 
we need to take a short excursus in phi losophical/systematic theology in 
order to get a tlrm grasp on the concept of monergism. As a theological 
term, " monergism" is generally defined as entailing the work of God alone 
to the excl usion o f all human working or activ ity. \'\fh ether God is working 
alone in a uni lateral sense that does not entail determinism, or whether the 
Lord is working alone in a deterministic/ irresistible2K sense, the basic idea 
is that the Lord is the 01lly causal actor in any moment of monergistic grace 
to the exclusion of all human working, as the term itself suggests. '" 
Monergism is typically seen as contrasting with synergism, which involves 
both divine and human work- divine/human cooperation. 
It seems clear from the evidence marshaled by Coll ins and Maddox that 
John Wesley did develop both synergistic and monergistic conceptions of 
grace. 311 The conjunction of divine working alld human working is not 
suftlcient to capture the totality of Wesley's thought on grace; one needs an 
even larger conjunction involving both divine-human cooperation and the 
work of God alone." As we have already noted, Wesley explicitly states 
that God works utterly alone in the creation of the world. In addi tion to 
this, Wes ley sees God as working unilaterally in many of the Lord's 
providenti al acts, including some that involve human beings and their 
salvation. For instance, as \'\fesley notes, God's sovere ign power alone 
establi shes the following decree: " H e that believeth shall be saved: he that 
believeth not shall be damned."" 
Moreover, as Collins rightly notes, a logical implication o f Wesley's views 
on original sin and total depravi ty is that prevenient g race (in Outler's 
" narrow sense," which is the more common usage in Wesley) must also be 
understood as a species of genuine monergism in terms of restoring four 
key features of human personali ty in response to the fall: a basic knowledge 
of the attributes of God, a partial re-inscription of the moral law, conscience, 
and a measure of free will.33 Apart from God's prevenient grace, we would 
be a mass of sin, utterly unable to respond to God either positively or 
negatively, for we would lack the essential features suftlcient for personhood. 
Collins is explicit that God's work is " irresistible" at this point. 1• This might 
be something of a misnomer, as on Wesley's view there is no person in 
place capable of res isting God's grace apart from this restoring prevenient 
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grace due to the severe effects of the Fal!." Nevertheless, God's work in 
the initial restoring act of prevenient grace is at least unilateral in that God 
is the only one working. Indeed, even the ongoing prevenient overtures of 
God's grace in addition to this initial restoring activity can be characterized 
rightly as monergism insofar as they continue to occur apart from our 
positive response (and in the face of our negative response), which reveals 
the unilateral, though non-deterministic, nature of ongoing prevenient 
g race.'" Any positive response to grace depends upon God's ongoing 
bestowal of prevenient grace.37 So both initial, restoring prevenient grace 
and ongoing prevenien t grace are examples of genuine monergism, for 
God works alone in both instances. 
Does Wesley develop a monergistic understanding of justification / 
regeneration and entire sanctification? I think the answer to this is in one 
sense "yes" and another sense " no." In order to approach this particular 
issue, we first need to note that Collins seems to use the language of 
"monergism" and "the work of God alone" (interchangeably) to refer to 
two somewhat different phenomena in his theological interpretation of 
Wesley. On the one hand, he uses it to refer to the unilateral or irresistible / 
deterministic work of God that does not involve or entail any human 
response whatsoever, such as the Lord's work in prevenient grace. 1S On the 
o ther hand, he uses it to refer to justification/ regeneration and entire 
sanctification, which he holds are resistible works of God that require the 
necessary condition of our free reception 3 9 This dual-usage can also be seen 
in the fact that Collins uses his umbrella term for the monergistic work of 
God, " free grace," to cover God's conditional work in justification/ 
regeneration and entire sanctification, as well as the unilateral or irresistible/ 
deterministic work of God in prevenient grace4 0 
This ambiguity in Collins's terminology is likely a reflection of Wesley'S 
own slightly ambiguous use of thi s language, which is actually an indirect 
tes tament to Collins's faitllfulness to t11e source material. '" Wesley himself 
applies monergistic language both to th e unilateral or irres istible/ 
deterministic work of God in creation, providence, and prevenient grace, 
which we have already seen, and to the resistible and conditional work of 
God in justification/regeneration and entire sanctification, An example of 
the latter usage can be found in Predestinatjon Calmly Considered, in which 
\,(!esley asserts, " It is tl,e work of God alone to justify, to sanctify, and to 
glorify; which three comprehend the whole of salvation."" Furthermore, 
in addition to speaking of the unilateral or irresistible/ deterministic work 
of God in creation as a species of "free grace," Wesley also speaks of 
God's resistible and conditional work in conversion as "free" as well: "One 
may freely give you a sum of money, on the condition you stretch out your 
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hand to receive it. It is therefore no contradiction to sa)" 'We are justified 
frecly by grace, and yet upon certain terms and conditions."'4,; 
It is straightforwardly clear how God's work in crcation, providence, 
and prevenient grace can be accurately described as monergism in Wesle\es 
thought: there are no conditions for human beings to meet at such junctures, 
so it clear that God works utterly alone at such moments, whe ther this is 
understood in a unilateral or an irresistible/deterministic sense. What is 
less clear is how God's work in justi fica tion / regenera tion and entire 
sanctification can be accurately described as monergism in light of both 
Wesley's and Collins 's affirmation that aspirants of these graces must 
perform a free'4 act of consent in order to receive them. Can this apparent 
contradiction be resolved? Can we make sense of monergism at these 
moments of grace, or must Wesley be interpreted as a synergist with respect 
to Justification/ regeneration and entire sanctification for the sake of logical 
consistency? 
Collins describes the condition of consent required to receive these graces 
as an ",,!tJ/oJtpassive" act of surrender and faith. 45 He wam s to avoid calling 
this surrender a "work,"'" but it seems clear that insofar as one is not totally 
passive when one exercises such an act of faith, one is engaged in some 
degree of activity, however minimal. Such an almost passive act is still an 
act, which is to say that it is a movemem or operation of the wi ll that 
requires some measure of causal exertion by the agent. Because thi s ac t is 
enabled by God's ongoing prevenient grace, we are talking about di\'ine-
human cooperation here; in other words, we are still in the synergistic model 
at this point. 
This does not, however, complete the piCl"me of what happens in these 
crucial moments of grace. While we indeed do someth ing even in an almost 
passive act of faith, what exac tl y is it that we do? If we understand this act 
of faith as leading to a state of "openness" before God in Weslev's theology, 
as Collins does''', it is plausible that the goal of such an act is to enter into 
a state of truly total passivity before God's grace. Collins seems to express 
a worry that total passivity before God's grace would rule out genuine human 
freedom and entail determinism, which is why he is careful to describe the 
act of faith in crucial moments of grace as being "almost" passive4 ' While 
this concern is understandable, it seems clear to me that so long as Cod 
docs not causaliy determine us to choose something in such moments, and 
so long as an agent freely chooses to enter into a state of total passivitl' 
before God's grace, there is nothing incompatible between lotal pa>si\'il)' 
and stanclard accounts of libertarian freeclom and hum an "gencI', \'(Ih3" 
this means, interestingly enough, is that monergism does not necessari h' 
entail determinism even when it comes to our positive responses to Cod. 
In order to get an idea of what such an act of surrender would look like, 
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consider the analogy of a pa tien t submitting to an inherently painful 
operation by a medical professional. The natural inclination of the patient 
is to resist the doctor's work altogether because of the unavoidable pain 
involved in the procedure. Resistance represents activity of the will, 
regardless o f how considerable or slight that activity is. Now imagine that 
this operation requires the patient to lie flat and idle on a table. If the 
patient chooses to submit to the operation, she essentially chooses to cease 
resisting and enter into a state of complete and utter inactivity of the will. 
Although it takes an act of the will to enter into snch a state, the state itse lf 
represents total passivity and a complete lack of human effort and willings. 
T he only person working after such a surrender is the doctor who is 
performing the operation. 
If we apply the same kind of sequential thinking to justi fi cation / 
regeneration and entire sanctification, we can see the subtle way in which 
synergism gives way to monergism at these crucial operations of grace. By 
freel y and cooperatively relaxing ourselves into the grace of God through 
an almost passive act of faith , we ente r into a state of total passivity before 
God's grace. In this ac t, we simply cease giving into our natural inclination 
to resist the grace of God. Such an act of faith should be understood as a 
complete relincluishment of all exertion and activity, as one surrenders to 
an operation or to sleep:" This synergis tic act of surrender, which is enab led 
by the ongoing prevenient grace of God, gives way to genuine monergism 
once human activity completely ceases and the Lord alone is at work. 
While justification/ regeneration and entire sanctification are different 
from o ther instances o f monergism in Wesley's theology in that they require 
a synergistic work of faith as a necessary condition to receive these graces, 
once thi s condition is met we indeed break through to genuine monergism 
at these soteriological points.'" By willing to enter into a state of non-willing, 
we choose a state of completely pass ive openness before God as the Lord 
alone works unilaterally. \'Ve need not first "be or do thus or thus," as Wesley 
puts it, in terms of contributing to God's work beyond presenting ourselves 
to God so that the Most High can accomplish it. S! God is the one and on ly 
causal ac tor in such moments. Moreover, the powerful works of g race 
wrought by God at the soteriological points of justification/regeneration 
and entire sanctification are radically disproportionate to the paltry work 
we do to receive them, and far more crucial than the gradual growth in 
grace that takes place before and after these moments." 
In the course of this ana lysis, I have touched upon two related issues 
that must nevertheless be kept distinct in order for fru it ful dialogue on 
\'Vesleyan grace to co ntinue to take place. T he fir st is the matter of 
inte rpretation: What did Wesley mean? What reconstruction reflects his 
most mature theological reflection? The second is the question of logical 
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consistency and theological soundness: Was Wesley logically consistent in 
his various aftirmations? Docs he ever equivocate over certain termse ll j 
have not developed a fully-orbed model of Wesley's theology fit to compete 
with that of Collins and Maddox in this short paper. Instead, I have foc used 
my analysis of Wesleyan grace on the issue of monergism and synergism in 
Wesley's theology of grace. I affirm with Maddox and Collins that in Wesley's 
thinking, God displays genuine monergism in the Lord 's crea ting and 
sustaining activity in the world. Furthermore, I agree wid1 Collins that Wesley 
sees God as working alone in the work of prevenient grace. J also have 
noted that \'(Ies ley understand s God to work monergistica ll y in certa in 
providential decrees. 
When it comes to justification / regeneration and entire sanctifica tion, I 
believe Collins is on the right track in identifying these works of g race as 
instances of monergism in Wesley's thought. '" T here is no doubt that Wesley 
uses the language o f "the work of God alone" to characterize th ese 
soteriological moments. I have presented some fu rther clarifi cations and 
distinctions that can help us see that there is an irreducible element of 
synergism involved in almost passively receiving these graces. T his synergism 
gives way to monergism as the will chooses to drain itself of all activity and 
effectively turn itself o ff before the g race of God." It does seem that 
genuine monergism logicall y entail s total passivity on the part of the agent 
at these points, for God must be the sole causal actor in order to be the 
only one working. This does not, however, imply or entail determini sm at 
these points. Moreover, it should be obvious that the cooperation entailed 
by almost passive acts of surrender is radically different from the synergism 
involved in our highly active works of mercy and piety, as we are talking 
about an almost pass ive act of surrender that resu lts in a state of total 
passivity. \X/e might employ a distinction between J1leak and J/rong synergism 
to make the difference clear.;(· 
T hope that the brief reflections offered in this paper can prompt fresh and 
exciting refl ec tion on the topics of methodology and grace in Wes leyan theology. 
Examining our methodology of theology tequires us to dig deeply in order to 
uncover our most ba sic philosophi ca l and theo logical presuppositiuns about th e 
nature of knowledge, reve lati on, and God. The more we exa min e these 
presuppositions, the berter our theological thinking will be. And when wc ana lyzc 
grace, we are analyzing the work of God in bringing people to salvation, a task that 
is as in1po rtant as it is chal.lenging. Whenever we enter in to either conversa tion , we 
must be sure to represent o ur dialogue partners accuTately so that fruitfu l and 
il lum inating in terac tion can take place.57 
BLANCHETTE: A BRIEF LOOK AT METHODOLOGY AND GRAC E 111 5 
End Notes 
1 Nathan Crawford, "Science and Theology in Conversation: E mergence 
Theories of Consciousness and Entire Sanctification," Asbury Theological JOtlrnal 64, 
no. 1 (Spring 2009): 40-41. 
2 Ibid., 41. 
3 Ibid., 50. 
4 Ibid. , 40. 
5 Ibid., 48-49 
G Note that I am no t claiming that th e Bible should unconditionally override 
our inuependent judgments in every instance. The evidence from the Bible has to 
be strong enough, and the evidence from narure has to be weak enough, to make 
such moves epistemically sensi bl e. 
7 Kenneth J. Collins, Evallgelical MOII/eIlt (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2005), 
71 -78. 
8 Paul D raper, "God, Science, and Naruralism" in Oxford Handbook of Philosophy 
of Religion (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 283-284 
9 Crawford, "Science and Theology in Conversation," 50. 
10 Crawford, 48. 
11 All subsequent references to John Wesley's works are taken from The 1170rks 
of .John 1I7e.rfey, vols. 1- 14 (Grand Rapid s: Baker Books, 2007). Sermons, 1:7 This is 
not to say that all miracles must be instantaneous. The concept of a progressive or 
gradual miracle is certainly coherent. 
12 If God does not exist, evolution is the only explanation available to explain 
both the existence and the complexity of life. The theist has more explanatory 
options on the table. 
U Crawford, "Science and Theology in Conversation," 48. 
14 Kenneth J. Collins, The Theology of Iohn We.rfq: Holy J and the Shape of 
Crace (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2007), 15-16. 
15 K enneth J. Collins, "John Wesley's Topography of the Heart: Dispositions, 
Tempers, and i\ffections," Methodist History 36, no. 3 (April 1998): 162-75. 
"Collins, Tbe Tbeology of John Wesley, 293-303. 
17 Ibid., 217-222. 
18 While I affirm the validity of Wesley's distinctions here, I think more are 
necessary to explain the complex nature of the will, sin , and sin's effects on our 
relationship with God. Willfulness, for instance, can come in degrees, from the 
most fully flagrant act to the mos t passive and subtle consent of the will. There are 
many actions that can be partly meant for good and partly meant for ev il. Inbred 
sin (distinct from temptation) invariably results in actual/willful sin in some measure, 
the willfulness of which can come in degrees. The new birth may subdue our sinful 
nature, but insofar as we are still sinful, it will find expression in our everyday lives 
in some measure until we are perfected in love. It is therefore appropriate to speak 
of ongoing forgiveness in the Christian walk. 
19 Crawford, "Science and T heology in Conversation," 46. 
20 Randy L. Maddox, Riisponsible Cmce:Iohll Wesleys Practical Theology (Nashville: 
Abingdon Press, 1994), 74-75. 
11 6 I He A sbJllyjollrllo/ 66/ 1 (2011) 
'I Collins, The Tbeology of John West')', 64. 
" Ibid., 12-13. 
23 Ibid ., 162; 292-293. 
" Maddox, 86-87 
" Collins, 204. 
" , Maddox, 55. 
" Collins 27-28. 
2k D etermini sm is the view that an agent's actio ns are determin ed by causall y 
sufficient prior causcs outside of the agent's conrrol. 'r n say grace is irresistible in a 
theological context usually means that such grace causa ll y determi nes th e choice(s) 
of the will , whether prox imately o r remotely. God clearl y works monergisti ca ll y 
when His work alone is causally suffi cient to determine hu man choice(s) . 
"J C f. " Pelagia n ism: A Mo nergis t Mo de l of Rede mp tio n ," h trp :/ / 
eva ngelicalarmi ni ans.org/ glynn. Pelagian ism. f\ -Monergis t -tv! oJe l-of-Redemp tion 
(although J do thin k Arminiaism aLlows for monergism beyond initiati ng prevenient 
grace); "A Simple E xplanati on of Mo nergism," h ttp:/ / www.rno nergism.curn / 
tberbreshold /a rticles/onsire/ rnonergisrn_sim plc.h tml; and "Monergism," hllp:/ / 
dicrionary.reference.com/browse/monergism. We will sec that C od can be the " (l il ly 
effici en t cause" of jus ti fica tion / regeneratio n and e ntire sa nc ti fication w itho u l 
overriding genuine human freedo m, so long as G-od does not causa ll y determine 
our choices in such m Oll1e nts, and so lo ng as human beings are free to ca use 
th emselves to enter into a s tate of total inactivi ty of the will. In other words, God 
ca ll work alone in a real sense witho ut wo rking determi nistically, which ma y come 
as a surprise to some Ca lvi ni sts. 
'" ColLins, 155-164; Maddox 91-93. 
II Collins, 164- /65. 
" " Predes tination Calmly Considered," Letlm, EJS{{),s, Dialogs (/1Ir1ArlrlresJeJ, 10:235. 
:n 1 n my own view (distin ct from \Xlcsley's), 1 bel ieve it is more accurate to 
speak of God 's prevenient grace IIpholriing or presen';lIg these features of humiln 
personhood. In other words, I do not believe the fi rst sin of the Fall caused humanir), 
to plunge immediately into total depravity, at which point God needed to reJ/{)re th e 
basic fea tures o f personhood. Rather, I bel ieve that C od's grace swooped in 
immediately (and unilaterally) at Lhe Fall, checki ng the downward spiral of sin and 
g iving us th e cho ice to respo nd positi vely to GoJ o r to reject this grace and beco me 
yet worse. O n thi s vicw, ir is stiLl th e case th at any goodn ess remai ning in hUIl1a n 
beings is due to the prevenien t grace of God; it is just pre.fcrJ'{'r/ goodn ess. 
not restorerl goodness. I find it implausible that the fi rst sin of the Fall wou ld resulr 
in total depravity . 
. 11 Co ll ins, 70-82. 
15 Collin s seems to contrad ict implic itl y his own view on the irresistibility of 
initial prevenient grace in a footno te, in which he deni es th at God ever disp lays 
"deterministic actjvity" w hen he works Illonergistica ll y, incl udi ng in prevenient g ran :. 
Sec Collin s, 79; 350 n197 It is more accurate, I think, to describe God's monergistic 
\vork in prevenie nt g race as uni lateral rather than irresistib le/determini stic 
,(, O f course, o ur \v ills may be actively engaged in sin when G od draws us with 
prevenient grace, but the po int is that this grace continues to wo rk even \v hen \ve 
BLANCHE'n'E: A BRI E l,' L OO]( AT METl-IOD( )1.()GY AND GRA CE I 11 7 
are not performing any posjrive work \vith n:spcct to our sa lvation . 
37 In iny view, it is when we respond positively to prevenient grace that it 
beeollleJ ju ,tifying and " nctifying grace. Seemingly discrete categories of grace often 
bleed in to one another in practice. 
3H Collins, 80-82. 
'" Ibid., 15, 160-165; 203-205; 292. 
4D Ibid., 82; 160-161; 203; 291-292. 
41 In fac t, the am biguity goe, deeper in We,ley,", he i, somewhat unclear as to 
whether conversion is resistible or irresistib le. See ,ferIlIOIlJ, 6:2HO-289; Lelte1:lj /-!.'.fJqyJ, 
DialogsalldAddresses, 10:363; 10:230-231; 10:309. Collins picks up on this ambiguity 
in Wesley's thought in his earlier work, The Senptllre If:7ery of SahJatioll (Nashville: 
Abingdon press, 1997),98-99 As we mentioned, Collins is clear in his most recent 
work that he views justification / regeneration (conversion) as resistible. Evidently, 
Collins believes that the maUlte Wesley moved beyond the irresistibili ty of converting 
grace, at least in most cases. 
42 Letters, En'!ys, Dialogs and Addresses, 10:230. 
43 Ibid., 10:209. 
44 Wesley clea rly has a libertarian (I\rminian) view of freedom. Thus, for him 
a free act is an undeterm ined act. See Letters, Esserys, Dialogs and Addrenes, 10:468-
469. Calvini sts do not deny that we repent and exercise faith, but they hold that 
such actions are determined by God, and repentance and faith are typicalJy seen as 
fo llowing regeneration rather than preceding it. But how can Calvinists consisten tl y 
hold that God is the only actor / agent in salvation from start to fi n ish (total 
monergism), as they generally do, while also hold ing tha t human beings have any 
real kind of agency, as they generall y wa nt to do' Wha t thi s reveals, I thin k, is that 
Calvinists often unwittingly display libertarian in tuitions with respect to human 
agency; without explicitly affirming it, Calvinists implicitly fi nd compatibilism to 
be insufficient to underwrite genu ine human agency. 
45 Collins, 15 . 
• 1(, Ibid. , 162- 163; 204. 
47 Ibid., 15. 
48 Ibid., 15, 163. 
'" What is crucia l here i, that the mil cea,e, all exertion and activity. The body 
natu rall y will still display activity, though in an involllntar), way, whether we are talki ng 
about surrendering to an operation or surrendering to the grace of God. 
50 Wesley seems to hold that God can bring about entire sancti fication (and 
presumab ly conversion) whenever the Lord pleases, it being a species of divine 
freedom and sovereignty. Indeed, in a key passage, Wesley seems to be affirming 
that it is only conditionally necessary that we do works do prepare to receive entirely 
sanctifying grace. See Collins Two things need to be said about this. At 
the very least, as Wesley (and Collins) affirms, faith is absolutely nece"ary to receive 
the gifts of God. If we refuse to meet this condition, then God cannot grant us 
these graces without overriding our personhood. Secondly, mo", if not all persons 
require time and opportunity to arrive at the state of spiri tual receptivity required 
to receive free ly entirely sanctifying grace. It is precisely our pride that must be 
overcome before God can convey entirely sanctifying grace in a way that respects 
11 8 I The AsiJllry ./ollnl(/i 66/ 1 (20 11) 
ou r personhood. So wh ile I affirm wit: h Wesley and Collins that the suteriu lugic .1 
timerable is surely in the hands and guidance of the Sovereign T ,ord , it is not just the wi ll 
uf God thal is a factor here, but also the will uf man. Most if not all people require time 
and opportuni ry before they are prepared to receive entirely sanctifying grace. 
5! Sermons 2:53 . Of course, we do have to freely receive these graces through 
an act o f faith. While such acts of surrender themselves surely are almost pass ive, 
it often takes a great amount o f moral effort- strenuous cooperation with C od 's 
g race-to overcome o ne's pride in order to be wil li ng to perfo rm alnlost passive acts 
o f surrender to God. 
52 Collins seems to assume that the work o f God alone and receiving g race 
always email a quali tative or instantaneous (crucial) change in Wes ley's thought, but 
I do not believe he has defended thi s entailment. See Colli ns 14-15. In my read ing 
of Wes ley, God works alone at various points throughout our Chri stian walk and 
the process o f sanctification, not just at crucial moments o f g race sll ch justification / 
regeneration and entire sanctification. T his means that there is " receiving g race" in 
Wesley's thought beyond quali tative or instantaneous works of grace. fu r an examp le 
of this, see SerJllollS 1:226. In other words, I think God can and does wo rk alone on 
us ill in cremenral degrees (\v ith us receiving thi s work over tinl e through almo st 
pass ive acts of faith) on Wesley'S view, as well as instantaneously and lJ uali ta hvel y 
(such as in jusl'ifi ca l' ion / regenerarion and entire sanctifi carion). 
33 N o te th at the issue here is logica l co nsistency and proper use o f theolog ica l 
language. While 1 certainly affirm that there is plen ty of room for mys tery, paradox, 
and tension in theology in their proper place, we ought to push logic and clari ty as 
far as they can go before appeali ng ro such notions, and we certainly should no t be 
comfortab le with logical contradictions. T he point of a soteriological model, afte r 
all , is to explain, not to obscure. 
54 As Colli ns rightly points out, Wesley does use parall el language when 
describing justification / regeneration and entire sanctifi cation, implying that God 
works in comparatively instantaneous/quali tative ways in both. See Coll ins 287-
288. In my own view (distinct from Wesley's) , entire sanctifica tion is just the 
comp letio n of th e process o f sann ific(lrion (which includes bo th rece iv ing and 
responding grace along the way) . O n this view, entire sanctifi cation is sri ll a threshold 
change o f so rts: it issues in a qualitatively di sti nct kind o f li fe (a life without the 
drag of original sin) as we ll as a quantitative change (l ess sinfulness than before, 
namely, none) . 
55 Although J do no t endorse tb e en ti rety o f his analysis and concl usions, my 
analysis regarding freedom and grace here is indebted to Kevin Timpe's "G race 
and Controlling What We D o N ot Cause" in Faith alld PbiloJophy 24, no. 3 (2007) . 
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